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Professor  Ratchford‘s  insightful  comments  provide  n  nice  opportunity 
to  shed  extra  light  on  some  points.  Most  of  his  remarks  deal  with  the 
estimation  of  the  WFI.  He  points  out  correctly  that  his  doubts  about 
the  validity  of  the  WFI-concept  do  not  necessarily  affect  the  validity  of 
the  preference  formation  theory.  We  agree  with  most  of  his  remarks 
and  disagree  with  some.  In  ;I  few  GISCS our  review  appears  to  have  been 
too  brief  to  get  basic  points  across.  In  any  c;w,  we  have  tried  to  give  an 
overview  of  an  ongoing  research  project.  so  that  any  suggestion  which 
may  help  in  directing  future  research  is  welcome. 
Let  us  discuss  Ratchford’s  comments  in  the  S;IIIW  order. 
l‘hc  rchtion  between  WFI  and  utility 
‘In  st:rnJarJ  economics.  utility  refers  to  a  preference  ordering...‘.  Ratch- 
ford  says.  This  is,  of  course,  true.  And  if  the  utility  indicator  were  only 
an  ordinal  representntion  of  ;l  preference  ordering.  direct  asking  for 
welfare  Ievcis.  as  is  done  in  the  measurement  of  the  WFI.  woutd  not 
make  sense.  As  Ratchford  himself  points  out,  however,  there  are  many 
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cardinal  utility  indicator.  It  seems  likely  that  preference  orderings  are 
stable  across  decision  problems.  in  the  sense  that  they  don’t  change 
whimsically  from  one  problem  to  the  other.  So.  if  a  utility  function  can 
serve  as  a  representation  of  preferences  in  one  situation,  it  can  also 
serve  as  a  representation  of  preferences  in  another  situation.  In  other 
words,  if  utility  is  cardinal  in  one  case.  then  it  is  cardinal  in  all  cases. 
If  we  then  assume  that  utility  can  be  measured  on  a  cardinal  scale, 
the  question  arises  how  it  can  be  measured.  The  obvious.  and  most 
often  practiced,  approach  is  to  start  from  the  axiomatization  that  is 
used  to  characterize  behavior  in  the  decision  problem  at  hand  and 
derive  measurement  procedures  accordingly.  For  example.  if  we  choose 
axioms  to  describe  rational  behavior  under  uncertainty,  the  obvious 
approach  to  the  measurement  of  utility  is  to  devise  gambling  experi- 
ments.  But  we  are  not  forced  to  approach  measurement  in  this  way.  If 
we  accept  that  utility  is cardinal  and  basically  invariant  across  decision 
situations,  one  would  expect  the  scale  values  themselves  to  have  some 
meaning  to  individuals.  The  IEQ.  and  its  variants,  is an  attempt  to  tap 
this  meaning. 
A cheek  on  the  validity  of  the  WFI  is then  whether  the  measurement 
results  show  a  pattern  that  is consistent  with  the  thcorctical  notion  of 
utility. 
Although  WC return  to  this  last  point  at  various  junctures,  one 
observation  can  be  made  already:  Rutchford  contrasts  the  WFI  with 
the  usual  economic  definition  of  utility  and  concludes  that  ‘ utility 
would  bc  dcfincd  as  the  rcsponsc  to  a  survey  question  which  cvaluatcs 
various  incomc  Icvcls  rather  than  an  expression  of  the  ordering  or 
intensity  of  prefcrcnccs’.  At  least  in  this  respect  the  WFI  fits  perfectly 
within  mainstream  economic  theory.  because  a  so-called  indirect  utility 
function  is  also  a  descriptor  of  the  utility  derived  from  incomc  (with 
prices  given.  and  generally  only  up  to  a  positive  monotonic  trimsforma- 
lion). 
Construct  validity 
Ratchford  lists  a  number  of  criteria  for  construct  validity  that  should 
be  satisfied  by  the  WFI.  Let  us  briefly  see  how  well  the  WFI  fares  on 
these  criteria. Observational  meaningfulness:  So  far  we  have  simply  not  encountered 
an  instance  where  empirical  results  obtained  with  the  WFI  were  widely 
divergent  from  our  theoretical  expectations. 
Internal  consistency:  Ratchford  suggests  that  this  ‘. . .could  be  as- 
sessed  by  determining  how  well  the  fitted  WFI  relations  predict  income 
values  associated  with  scale  levels  which  were  held  out  in  estimation’. 
We  have  not  exactly  done  this,  but  the  very  good  fit  of  the  regression 
that  is used  to  estimate  a respondent’s  WFI  (see  Kapteyn  and  Wansbeek 
1985:  section  4  and  fn.  4)  implies  that  such  predictions  would  be  quite 
good. 
Conrergent  cdidity  :  It  is  of  interest  that  family  equivalence  scales 
constructed  on  the  basis  of  WFls  are  similar  to  scales  obtained  from 
the  (very  different)  revealed  preference  approach  to  the  measurement  of 
utility.  Thus.  two  very  different  approaches  to  the  measurement  of 
utility  agree  quite  well.  This  suggests  that  both  approaches  measure  the 
same  thing.  viz..  utility.  Convergent  validity  for  the  WFI  itself  has  not 
been  established  so  firmly.  An  ongoing  project  by  Dubnoff  (Center  for 
Survey  Research,  Boston).  funded  by  the  National  Science  Foundation. 
will  hopefully  shed  some  more  light  on  this  issue  hcfore  too  long. 
Discri~~rinmt  rvrlitlitJ*:  This  has,  indeed,  not  been  invcstigatcd  yet. 
I II  suni.  previous  rcscarch  has  not  focusscd  on  all  criteria  for  construct 
validity.  To  the  cxtcnt  th;it  it  has  been  clone,  results  arc  rather  rc’assur- 
1ng. 
Regarding  the  equal  interval  assumption  we  reproduce  here  an  em- 
pirical  result  obtained  by  Antonidcs,  Kapteyn  and  Wansbcck  (1980). 
They  consider  the  case  where  the  lab&  used  in  the  IEQ  are  ’ very  bad’. 
’ bad’,  ‘insufficiL’nt’.  ‘sufficient’.  ‘good’  and  ’ very  good’.  Apart  from 
using  these  labels  in  the  IEQ  (in  a simpler  version  than  the  one  quoted 
in  our  review),  they  also  ask  respondents  to  assign  a  number  between 
xro  and  ten  to  these  verbal  labels. 
Table  1 gives  some  results  for  a sample  of  314  respondents.  We  have 
dividd  all  numbers  by  ten.  thus  transforming  the  [O,lO]-scalt:  into  ;1 
[O.l]-scale.  For  comparison,  the  last  column  of  the  table  gives  the 
numerical  values  corresponding  to  the  equal  interval  assumption. 
If  we  look  upon  the  sample  means  as  unbiased  estimates  of  corrc- Table  1 
Numerical  values  attached  to  verbal  labels.  (N = 314.) 
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’  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  sample  standard  deviations  dwided  by  m. 
sponding  population  values,  then  the  numbers  in  parentheses  are  the 
standard  errors  of  the  estimates.  Obviously.  the  estimates  differ  signifi- 
cantly  (at  any  conventional  level  of  significance)  from  the  values 
implied  by  the  equal  interval  assumption.  Yet,  although  the  differences 
are  significant,  they  do  not  seem  to  be  large,  except  for  the  labels  ‘very 
bad’  and  ’ bad’. 
Basically,  Buyze  (1982)  comes  to  a  similar  conclusion.  She  also 
rejects  the  equal  interval  hypothesis,  but  at  the  same  time  concludes 
that  the  diffcrenccs  are  not  large.  Katchford  correctly  observes  that 
Buyze  assumes  lognormality  of  the  WFI  in  constructing  her  test.  Thus 
it  is  the  .jnirrf  h_vpofhesi.s  of  lognormality  and  equal  intervals  that  she 
rejects  and  it  is  also  the  joint  hypothesis  of  lognormality  and  equal 
intervals  that  may  still  provide  a  reasonable  approximation  to  reality. 
Ratchford  is  undoubtedly  right  in  stressing  that  the  labels  used  in  the 
IEQ  do  affect  the  possible  validity  of  the  equal  interval  assumption  if 
they  are  chosen  sufficiently  extreme.  The  information  theoretic  argu- 
ment  that  underlies  the  equal  interval  assumption  may  still  hold  as  long 
as  the  labels  are  not  too  obvious  in  contrast  with  the  notion  of  equal 
intervals.  In  any  case.  the  results  by  Antonides,  Kapteyn  and  Wansbeek 
suggest  that  the  information  theoretic  argument  gives  results  that  are  in 
the  right  ball  park,  for  the  wording  usually  employed. 
Upper  bound 
‘In  the  standard  theory,  the  utility  function  has  no  upper  bound’. 
Ratchford  claims.  For  ordinal  utility  functions,  one  can  always  find  a transformation  that  guarantees  the  existence  of  an  upper  bound.  So. 
when  mentioning  ‘standard  theory’  he  presumably  does  not  refer  to 
neoclassical  ordinal  utility  functions.  For  the  rest.  whether  or  not  utility 
is  bounded  from  above  is  hard  to  decide  on  a  priori  grounds.  In  any 
case,  the  statement  that  ‘ . . . a  WFI  =  1  might  imply  more  total  happi- 
ness  for  one  person  than  another’,  is about  interpersonal  comparability 
and  not  about  cardinality.  These  are  two  very  different  concepts  (cf. 
Sen  1974). 
Ratchford’s  argument  against  the  boundedness  of  utility  may  be 
based  on  a  confusion  of.  in  this  case,  income  and  the  utility  of  income. 
If  he  would  trade  his current  meager  professor’s  salary  for  an  executive’s 
salary  at  General  Motors.  his  income  might  become  ten  times  as  large. 
but  there  is  no  reason  why  his  utility  would  increase  as  dramatically. 
The  statement  that  ‘people  always  seem  to  be  quite  pleased  to  make 
more  money  if  they  don’t  have  to  work  for  it’  is completely  consistent 
with  this  observation.  That  we  may  never  be  satisfied  with  what  we 
have,  has  more  to  do  with  habit  formation  than  with  the  boundcdness 
of  the  utility  function. 
To  some  extent  we  do  define  concepts  by  the  way  we  measure  them. 
Rat&ford’s  statcmcnt  that  an  incomc  of  $100.000.000  might  give  ten 
times  as  much  satisfaction  as  an  ‘cxccilcnt’  income  of  $lOO,OOO is  not 
dcfincd  as  long  as  no  scale  of  satisfaction  has  been  introduced. 
A  rather  strong  thcorctical  argument  for  the  boundedncss  (from 
above)  of  utility  functions  is  provided  by  Mcngcr’s  so-called  super-St. 
I’ctcrshurg  pilrild0~  (cf.  S~llllll~lSOll  ( 1977)  for  discussion). 
As  a  final  ohscrvation,  it  should  be  noted  that  if  utility  is  not 
h~~~~~dccl  from  above.  then  there  must  exist  something  like  ‘infinite 
bliss’.  It  is hard  to  imagine  what  infinite  bliss  could  be,  or  how  ;I human 
being  coulcl  express  feelings  of  infinite  bliss.  Words  like  ‘suporb’  or 
‘excellent’  rather  seem  to  express  that  the  individual  cannot  imagine  to 
be  more  delighted  about  a  certain  aspect  of  life  and  this  entails  the 
boundedness  of  the  experience. 
Kcliitivc  well-being 
‘The  implication  that  a  doubling  of  all  incomes  would  leave  no  one 
better  off  would  seem  very  implausible..  . Wouldn’t  most  of  us  prefer 
that  state  of  affairs  to  our  current  one’.  Three  points  are  worth  making here.  First.  the  second  statement  is  irrelevant  to  the  first  one.  Even  if 
evaluations  are  completely  relative.  individuals  will  still  think  that  a 
doubling  of  their  income  makes  them  happier.  Only  quite  a  while  after 
they  (and  everyone  else)  have  received  the  higher  income,  will  their 
evaluation  of  their  income  have  dropped  to  the  level  previous  to  the 
doubling  of  incomes.  And  even  although  the  new  situation  does  not 
produce  greater  utility  than  the  old  situation.  individuals  will  think  that 
going  back  to  the  old  situation  will  make  them  less  happ!. 
This  also  illustrates  the  second  point  to  be  made.  The  implication 
that  a  doubling  of  all  incomes  would  leave  no  one  better  off  is  only 
implausible  e.r  an&,  i.e..  given  our  present  preferences.  But  e.~ posr. 
after  our  preferences  have  shifted,  we  don’t  feel  better  off. 
Thirdly.  our  experiments  with  WFIs  are  not  the  only  pieces  of 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  preference  formation  theory.  In  our  1982  article 
we  discuss  a  number  of  different  investigations.  from  fields  like  relative 
deprivation  theory,  adaptation-level  theory  and  reference  group  theory. 
that  all  lead  to  similar  conclusions. 
Rntchford  suggests  a  couple  of  times  that  the  method  of  measure- 
mcnt  of  WFIs  may  be  responsible  for  the  success  of  the  preference 
formation  theory.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  there  is  a  fair  amount  of 
cvidcncc  that  dots  not  rest  on  WFls.  it  is not  clear  why  the  formulation 
of  the  rI:Q  would  Icad  to  ;I  measure  of  rclativc  well-hcing.  In  the 
question  there  is  no  rcfcrcncc  to  the  position  of  others.  anti  thcrc  is  110 
apparent  reason  why  somconc  with  ;I  $35.000  annual  income  with  poor 
friends  would  be  Icd  by  the  lF,Q  to  evaluate  his  income  as  excellent, 
whcrzas  someone  with  very  wealthy  friends  cvaluatcs  the  same  $35,000 
as  barely  sufficient.  Yet.  this  is what  the  empirical  results  bear  out. 
Overall  WillU:ItiOI~  and  nceclccl  rcscarcti 
We  agree  with  Ratchford  that  especially  in  the  area  of  measurement  of 
W Fls  a  lot  of  additional  work  remains  to  be  done.  Fortunately.  SOIIW  of 
this  work  is  being  done  right  now:  we  illlI!ildy  mentioned  Dubnoff’s 
NSF-project. 
Still.  we  feel  that  certain  empirical  regularities  arc  firmly  established. 
In  particular,  the  preference  formation  theory  holds  up  quite  well.  The 
doubts  about  certain  aspects  of  WFI  measurement  \vouId  suggest, 
moreover,  that  the  empirical  tests  of  the  preference  formation  theory 
are  biased  against  it,  rather  than  in  favor  of  it. References 
Antonides.  G..  A.  Kapteyn  and  T.J.  Wansbcrk.  1980.  ‘Reliahllicy  and  \nlidity  ;Lsscssment of  ten 
methods  for  the  mexarement  of  individual  welfare  functions  of  income.  Working  paper. 
htcxielling  Research  Group.  University  of  Southern  Cahfornia.  Los  Angeles. 
Bu~zr.  J..  1982.  The  rstimatton  of  welfare  levels  of  a cardinal  utility  function.  European  Economic 
Review  17.  325-331. 
Kapreyn.  A.  and  T.J.  Wansbeek.  1982.  Empirical  evidence  on  preference  formation.  Journal  of 
Economic  Psychology  2.  137-  154. 
Krtptryn.  A.  and  T.  Wansbeek.  1985.  The  individual  welfare  function:  a  review.  Journal  of 
Economic  Psychology  6.  333-363. 
Samuelson.  P.A..  1977.  St.  Petersburg  puradnnes:  defanged.  dissected.  and  historically  drwrihed. 
Journal  of  Economic  Literature  20.  24-55. 
Sen.  A.K..  1974.  Informational  bases of  alternative  welfare  approaches.  Journal  of  Public  Ecomxn- 
its  3.  3X7-403. 